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3 The End of Rent-Seeking
The End of Postcommunist Transformation
Anders Åslund
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
During the last seven years, 27 countries in Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union have departed from communism and attempted to
build some kind of a market economy.  Initially, the prescriptions pre-
sented by mainstream economists sounded rather similar in essence,
although there was a great deal of debate over sequencing and speed.  
Today, the most striking observation is how differently various
postcommunist countries have fared.  Poland returned to economic
growth in 1992, and its total decline is now considered to have been
less than 10 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).  Other Central
European countries experienced only slightly greater decreases.  Most
post-Soviet republics, on the contrary, have faced a drop from their
prior GDP of 40–50 percent even by optimistic estimates, and several
have still not returned to economic growth.
How can we explain these great differences?  The theoretical eco-
nomics literature on transition has focused particularly on the costs of
structural adjustment and how to minimize them.  The fundamental
idea has been for policy to establish an optimal trade-off between vari-
ous costs.  However, the very large declines in GDP can hardly be con-
sidered results of any structural adjustment.
The most straightforward explanatory variable is inflation, and the
degree and duration of inflation are, in turn, best explained by the
degree and duration of rent-seeking.  Inflation is largely caused by
rent-seeking, which tends to be financed though the state budget, either
through direct subsidies, such as price subsidies, or through hidden
ones, such as subsidized credits issued by the central bank or exchange
rate subsidies financed by foreign credits.  Ultimately, these various
subsidies derive from the state budget, but more transparent ones, such
as direct budget subsidies, do tend to be less significant, as it is hard to
defend them in any open political process.
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The main drama of the postcommunist transformation in my eyes
has been the strife between those who want to minimize rent-seeking
and those who want to maximize it.   Those who want to maximize it
have benefited personally from the huge rents of the transition.  Their
very aim has been rent-seeking, that is, the extraction of monetary ben-
efits from the government, either directly through subsidies or indi-
rectly through government regulations often connected with quasi-
fiscal expenditures.  The opposite of rent-seeking is profit-seeking in a
competitive market.  In some countries, notably Russia, parts of the
government have tried to contain rent-seeking, while other forces both
inside and outside of government have tried to maximize rent-seeking.
Increasingly, it becomes evident that rent-seeking is the key problem
after communism.1
The main tasks of postcommunist transformation are all related to
rent-seeking.  A great deal of this behavior is caused by arbitrage
between usually low, regulated state prices and higher free-market
prices at home or abroad, an opportunity resulting from regulation of
prices and exportation.  Privatization is the most contentious issue.
Many see it as the essence of rent-seeking (Goldman 1994; Nelson and
Kuzes 1995), while others, including me, would rather consider it the
end of rent-seeking (Kaufmann and Siegelbaum 1996).
In order to clarify the type of rent-seeking I am addressing, I shall
first detail the main forms of rents in the Russian transition and assess
their size and development.  Curiously, rent-seeking has shrunk consid-
erably, and the main question of this paper is to clarify how and why
rent-seeking has waned.  In doing so, I broaden the spectrum to the
whole region, to offer an understanding of why this change has
occurred in various countries.
THE NATURE OF POSTCOMMUNIST RENT-SEEKING
When communism was collapsing, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR) was a paradise for rent-seeking.  Large fortunes
could be made in no time thanks to connections and ruthlessness.  The
methods were many, but three were particularly important.  Today, we
can establish both the techniques and the amounts involved.
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The fundamental method of rent-seeking was arbitrage: to buy
cheaply anything at fixed state prices and to sell at a high free-market
price.  The great spree of arbitrage occurred in 1991 and 1992, when
raw materials, notably oil, natural gas, and metals, sometimes cost less
than 1 percent of the world market price.  Traders who had access to
these commodities in Russia and were able to sell them abroad made
untold fortunes in a few deals.  Considering domestic and world mar-
ket prices and the volume of exports, total rents arising from the sales
abroad of oil, gas, and metals amounted to about 30 percent of Russia’s
GDP in 1992.2  The export rents were particularly large in Russia,
because of its large sales of raw materials and semimanufactured goods
such as metals, but even Ukraine had huge rents from exports of under-
priced metals.
A second major source of rents was import subsidies.  They arose
from multiple exchange rates, allowing another kind of arbitrage.  In
1992, an importer paid only 1 percent of the official exchange rate for
the hard currency needed to import essential foods, and that year no
less than 15 percent of Russian GDP went to import subsidies (Interna-
tional Monetary Fund 1993, pp. 132–183, 140).  These import subsi-
dies were financed off the budget with Western commodity credits and
did not show up in the Russian budget.  Yet, the Russian state is respon-
sible for servicing and paying back these international credits.  In
Ukraine, gas imports have continued to be a major source of rent-seek-
ing.  Until the end of 1994, oil and gas imports were subject to privi-
leged exchange rates.  In effect, Ukraine’s gas importers’ privileges
were financed by Russia’s natural gas company Gazprom, as nonpay-
ments to Gazprom made up the bulk of Ukraine’s large debt to Russia.3
A third form of rent to the privileged was subsidized credits, which
were huge throughout the ruble zone in 1992 and 1993.  When prices
were liberalized in January 1992, money became scarce, as the money
supply did not rise as fast as prices.  The state enterprises urged the
government and the central bank to replenish their working capital.
Unfortunately, the government and the central bank tried to accommo-
date this request.  From June until September 1992, the Russian money
supply increased by almost 30 percent a month.  Worse, most of these
credits were issued at highly subsidized interest rates, at 10 or 25 per-
cent per annum, while inflation was 2,500 percent that year.  Thus, the
credits were virtual gifts from the state to the receiving enterprises.
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The total volume of credit subsidies amounted to some 30 percent of
GDP in 1992, but initially these sums were not included in the state
budget.4
Even so, Russia had less credit issue than most post-Soviet states.
Table 1 presents the net issue of credit in various countries in 1992.
The subsidization of credits was almost as large as the net issue of
credit, as very low nominal interest rates prevailed at the time.  We can
note that the amount of subsidized credits was larger in several other
former Soviet republics than in Russia in 1992, while it was much less
in the Baltic states.  In 1993, Russia put its credit issue under some
control and ended up with an inflation of “only” 840 percent, while the
other former Soviet republics continued with very high credit issue,
leading to hyperinflation in 10 of them.
Incredibly, we can conclude that gross rents from these three
sources alone amounted to about 75 percent of GDP in Russia in 1992.
The situation varied from country to country, but these three forms of
rent were strongly developed in the whole of the former Soviet Union.
None of these rents can be defended from any social point of view, but
they were technically legal.  Little wonder that people had a perception
of lawlessness.  Moreover, the division of the spoils involved a great
Table 1 Net Revenues from Credit Issue in Post-Soviet Countries, 1992











SOURCE: Åslund, Boone, and Johnson 1996 (p. 257).
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deal of violent crime, particularly noticed in metal exports but also true
in the distribution of subsidized credits.
The conventional wisdom is that the great fortunes in Russia were
made through the voucher privatization, which largely benefited the
managers of what were previously state enterprises.  However, scrutiny
of the numbers does not support this perception.  By July 1997, the
Russian stock market had reached a total market capitalization of about
$100 billion, after having quintupled in 15 months.5  This market capi-
talization included most of the value in the Russian enterprise sector,
notably some 17,000 enterprises subject to voucher privatization, while
real estate and small and new enterprises were not included.  At the
time, Russia’s GDP was about $450 billion.  In other words, all the
fruits of the Russian voucher privatization were worth 22 percent of
GDP in 1997.  However, of this total figure, enterprise managers pos-
sessed only about 20 percent (Blasi, Kroumova, and Kruse 1997).
That is, the enterprise managers’ total gain from privatization after all
of the price increases in the stock market was as little as 4.5 percent,
while the total rents from the three sources discussed for the years
1991–1993 exceeded the GDP of one year.
In other countries, the direct rents from privatization were even
less.  Beside Russia, Poland has the largest market capitalization in
what was the Soviet bloc, and it was only $12 billion in July 1997.
Most of the other former Soviet republics privatized much less and
later than Russia, but, according to the World Bank, the Kyrgyz Repub-
lic had even larger income differentials than Russia in 1993, although it
had barely started its privatization then (World Bank 1996, p. 68).
While the direct benefits to managers from privatization were com-
paratively limited, much of rent-seeking, notably the export rents,
involved management embezzlement of enterprise profits, which a
strong owner would put an end to.  Moreover, privatization implies the
depoliticization and mostly deconcentration of ownership and the divi-
sion between enterprises and state.  Hence, strong alliances are often
broken up, particularly if independent enterprises start competing on
the market, and transparency also increases.  Thus, privatization is
likely to contribute to the end of rent-seeking, even if the very process
of privatization may involve a limited amount of rent-seeking.
The significance to personal wealth of rent-seeking versus privati-
zation becomes even more evident if we identify the social groups that
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are perceived as particularly rich in Russia.  The first group consists of
bankers, but most of the banks are new creations (Dmitriev et al. 1996).
Clearly, the bankers’ benefits were not so much from bank privatiza-
tion as from subsidized credits and export rents.  The second group
comprises the oil and gas barons, who made their fortunes on export
rents from 1991 through 1993: only in 1994 did their enterprises start
being privatized.  A third group is commodity traders, who thrived on
both export rents and import subsidies.  
In Ukraine, the metal exporters and the gas importers are the nota-
bly rich people, and in neither industry did any privatizations take
place until 1997.  Consistently, Ukrainians do not share the Russian
view that privatization has benefited the newly rich in business.  Thus,
the evidence suggests that privatization does not lead to primary rent-
seeking.  It is another matter that those who already have money can
buy assets and advance themselves further.
To conclude, a relatively small group has profited enormously
from the rent-seeking that arose during the end of communism and the
birth of capitalism in Russia.  The foremost rents have been export
rents, subsidized credits, and import subsidies.  They have been
strongly concentrated in the hands of some state enterprise managers
and early commercial operators in trade and finance.  In contrast to
profits, these rents have been extracted thanks to privileged access and
corruption rather than from competition on a free market.  The rents
have been shaped by state regulations that have effectively favored the
privileged.  Privatization has hardly contributed to this process.
WHY WAS RENT-SEEKING SO LARGE IN THE 
FORMER SOVIET UNION?
The general impression is that rent-seeking has been far greater in
Russia than elsewhere.  However, the same conditions that apply to
Russia are largely true of the other former Soviet republics, save the
Baltic states.  The contrast is rather between the former Soviet repub-
lics and East-Central Europe.  There are many reasons why rent-seek-
ing was worse in the former Soviet republics.  The causes were both
economic and political.  To a considerable extent, the severity of rent-
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seeking was the curse of the communists.  The communists abolished
private ownership in order to make the transition to socialism irrevers-
ible, but if there had been private ownership of the means of produc-
tion, rent-seeking would have been much more limited.
The fundamental problem was political, namely, that the Soviet
system created a small elite, about 1 percent of the population, that was
virtually omnipotent.  This elite controlled all levers of power and
faced few restraints.  In the old days, the system regulated itself, not by
law, but through the Communist Party, its control organs, and the KGB.
These mechanisms could not possibly be reconciled with a democratic
state, the rule of law, or a market economy.  Therefore, the controls had
to go with the demise of communism and left the old communist elite
more unrestrained than ever.  
The postcommunist state was very weak.  The absence of all kinds
of normal institutions—political, market, economic, and legal—meant
that few formal restrictions were at hand.  Communism was contemp-
tuous of the rule of law and tried to erase it.  Instead, the Nomenkla-
tura, the communist elite, was a law unto itself.  The people with the
best connections and the strongest will won regardless of the moral
standards they represented.  This situation fits well with Mancur
Olson’s logic of collective action.  In an atomized society such as Rus-
sia, small groups with a lot at stake were likely to be the best organized
and most effective (Olson 1971).  It was obvious that wild rent-seeking
would arise with the end of communism and that this rent-seeking
could really be considered a “poison pill” planted by the communists,
that is, a trap ensuring that the costs of abandoning communism would
be great.  The weakness of the postcommunist state was undoubtedly
greater in the Soviet Union than in East-Central Europe, because
Soviet communism lasted longer and was more ruthless.
Another problem with the postcommunist state was that democ-
racy was weak.  There is a strong correlation between political regime
and economic reform strategy.  Only democracies ruled by liberal gov-
ernments attempted radical reforms, while all of the socialist govern-
ments, democratic or not, opted for gradual reforms initially (Åslund,
Boone, and Johnson 1996, pp. 223–225).  It was natural that the social-
ist governments chose gradual reforms, because these led to the most
rent-seeking, which was in the interest of the strongest members of the
old elite.  That only some of the democratic regimes opted for radical
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reforms can be explained partly by new leaders not understanding the
problems they faced (which is also reflected in the Western debate over
postcommunist transformation), and partly by corrupt interests of the
leaders.  As the Central Asian countries show, dictatorships do appear
to indulge in more rent-seeking.  Hence, the idea that enlightened dic-
tatorship should be beneficial to postcommunist transition seems mis-
placed, as any postcommunist dictatorship by necessity would control
huge state resources, while being subject to little or no restriction.6
Conversely, the stronger democracies in Central Europe (e.g., Poland,
Czech Republic, and Hungary) and the Baltic countries (Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania) did a great deal to eliminate rent-seeking at an
early stage.
An additional political factor that influences rent-seeking is the
strength of civil society.  Unfortunately, in the postcommunist state,
civil society has largely been very weak and could therefore do little to
restrain rent-seeking.  The foremost exception is Poland.  Its strong
trade unions, workers’ councils, Catholic Church, and private peasants
were vehemently against radical reform, but, by checking the powers
of state enterprise managers and local officials, they managed to rein in
rent-seeking early so that it was barely perceived as a major problem.
Workers’ councils also existed in Hungary, where they had some
power, while those in the former Soviet Union disappeared without any
significant impact.
Wherever the media’s quality and independence were sufficient, it
exerted beneficial pressures on rent-seekers.  Again, the Central Europe
and Baltic countries came out well, but Russia also benefited from
strong media of high quality and independence from government,
although much of the media has now fallen into the hands of some of
the new major rent-seekers.  At the same time, strong criticism by the
Russian media has led to the misperception in many places that the
problems in Russia are worse, while the point is rather that they are
better known.
Thus, the overall power of the old elite over the rest of society dif-
fered between the regions of the former Soviet bloc, and with that the
rent-seeking varied.  I do not possess an overall measure of the extent
of rent-seeking in the transition, but the height and duration of inflation
are a good proxy, as most rent-seeking was eventually financed through
the state budget and thus boosted the budget deficit.  By that standard,
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the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) suffered particularly
badly from rent-seeking, and Central Asia, Caucasus, and Ukraine
most of all.  Note that most CIS states were worse off than Russia.  The
Balkans followed next, as illustrated by the inflation crisis in Bulgaria
and Romania as late as 1997.  The Baltics have actually done better
than those Balkan states, while the four Visegrad countries (Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) and Slovenia form a cate-
gory of their own with relatively little suffering.
There were also strong economic grounds for the prevalence of
rent-seeking.  The situation was aggravated by the nature of the com-
munist economic system, which was really a form of kleptocracy.  The
command economy in its ideal form did not work, and most market
economic adjustments were formally illegal.  Hence, the custom devel-
oped to steal whatever you could, and the limit was set by repression
rather than by law.  An old anecdote ran, “Which is the richest country
in the world?  The Soviet Union, because everybody has been trying to
steal as much as they can since 1917, and there is still plenty to steal.”
An important reason why the collapse of communism was so peaceful
was that the old elite had split into an ideological hard core and an eco-
nomically oriented group that wanted to abandon communism for per-
sonal economic gains.  However, the latter did not really want a
competitive market economy.  They preferred an intermediary stage in
which they could keep control over economic assets, benefiting from a
multitude of market distortions, while not suffering from the hardship
of market competition.  Naturally, these tendencies were worse in the
Soviet Union than in East-Central Europe due to the duration and
severity of communism; the same was true of more specific economic
causes.
In the former Soviet Union, there were no market economic stan-
dards of any kind, and economic distortions were extraordinary.  The
relative prices were particularly perverse, with domestic prices some-
times less than 1 percent of world prices in 1991 at the market
exchange rate.  The greater the discrepancy between domestic prices
and world prices, the greater the arbitrage, and the more distorted the
relative prices were, the stronger the resistance against price liberaliza-
tion.  Interest rates had played no role in the Soviet system, and no cap-
ital or credit markets existed.
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Another form of extortion was the wholesale trading system of the
former Soviet Union, which to a considerable extent was based on
politics rather than on economic calculation.  Transportation costs
were disregarded, while hauls could be enormous.  Thus, many eco-
nomic activities could not be justified if based on market pricing.  In
addition, defense expenditures probably comprised about one-quarter
of GDP towards the end of the Soviet Union, while they have fallen to
about 3 percent in postcommunist Russia.  Thus, some 22 percent of
GDP became redundant.
Another economic cause of massive rent-seeking was the deep
financial crisis that all postcommunist countries but Hungary and
Czechoslovakia faced at the end of communism;  this crisis was partic-
ularly severe in the former Soviet Union.  One of its aspects was a huge
deficit of possibly up to 30 percent of GDP in 1991; another was that
the Soviet Union defaulted on its foreign debt obligations in 1991,
which in turn led to an extremely low free exchange rate.  The budget
deficit was financed with a huge monetary emission, and inflation sky-
rocketed as soon as prices were liberalized.  The low exchange rate fur-
ther intensified the problems of price liberalization, while it increased
the opportunities for rents.
Finally, the larger the natural resource endowment, the greater the
natural rent, and the richer the opportunities for rent-seeking, particu-
larly in exports.  This situation points to more opportunities for rents in
the oil- and gas-rich countries—Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and
Turkmenistan—which coincides with our perception of reality.  It is
not by chance that some of the largest fortunes in Russia appear to have
been amassed in the oil and gas sectors.  There are now a number of
billionaires, and, at least until 1996, these were created by trade rather
than by management privatization.
A combined political and economic reason for the lack of restraints
on rent-seeking in the former Soviet Union was the extraordinary pub-
lic ignorance of what a market economy really meant.  Therefore, the
rent-seekers could get away with all kinds of arguments that were
unacceptable in East-Central Europe.  There was no understanding
whatsoever of capital and credit markets or that interest should reflect a
justified price of capital.  For example, Russian industrialists were up
in arms when the central bank raised the official refinance rates from
50 to 80 percent in the spring of 1992, while inflation that year
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amounted to 2,500 percent.  Their argument ran that no Western coun-
try had such a high (nominal) interest rate, saying nothing about how
no Western country had such large negative real interest rates.  Simi-
larly, post-Soviet public opinion reflected the conviction in 1992 that
monetary emission and large budget deficits stimulated production.
The concepts of fiscal and monetary restraints were not only unknown,
but disdained.  Indeed, inflation was thought of as stimulating produc-
tion, and many old Soviet economists spoke of the necessity of living
with hyperinflation for some time.
Marxist production fetishism remained very strong.  Hence, many
were against full liberalization of trade, because they argued that it
would not give any increased output, not realizing that the very alloca-
tion of production is vital for the functioning of an economic system.
As newly appointed prime minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin argued that
Russia did not need any “bazaar.”  The production fetishism also led to
weird perceptions of value, for example, that smokestacks were worth
fortunes while real estate and land were worth little.  Even if a majority
was in favor of private property, popular biases prevailed against some
kinds of individual ownership, notably of large enterprises and finan-
cial institutions.
A conviction persisted that Russia was dominated by large produc-
tion monopolies, which, according to the elite, justified far-reaching
control of trade; on the contrary, the real problem was trade monopo-
lies, which could only be checked through extensive liberalization of
trade (Brown, Ickes, and Ryterman 1994).  Similarly, it was argued that
Russia lacked “market infrastructure” and therefore could not with-
stand a swift deregulation of trade.  
The lack of economic understanding aroused an unjustified fear of
massive unemployment, while the true dilemma was poverty caused by
excessively hesitant economic policies that led to high inflation.  Simi-
larly, there was a very human fear that fast changes would be detrimen-
tal, while the opposite was actually true.  Characteristically, virtually
all of these obscurantist arguments favored gradual or no changes and
thus the rent-seekers.
It does appear highly plausible that rents have been greater in Rus-
sia than elsewhere.  These arguments, apart from resource endow-
ments, apply equally well to all CIS states, so I am not focusing on a
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primarily Russian situation.  Only the Baltics have escaped many of
the problems.
HOW RENT-SEEKING HAS BEEN REDUCED
Today, these blatant forms of rent-seeking have largely ceased.
The only postcommunist countries that have not put their economies in
elementary order with tenable macroeconomic stability are Belarus,
Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan.  Rent-seeking raged from 1991 to 1993
and has subsided since.  The reduction of rent-seeking tells us a great
deal about what was really important in the transition from a command
economy to a market economy.  
Technically, it was easy to abolish rent-seeking.  Only a few funda-
mental measures were undertaken.  In order to eliminate arbitrage, it
was necessary to apply three measures: to decontrol all prices, to liber-
alize both domestic and foreign trade, and to unify the exchange rate.
Largely, all of this has been accomplished in most CIS countries,
although corruption and many minor but harmful regulations remain.
Dishonest officials at all levels defend regulations in order to extort
bribes.
Interest subsidies were abolished in the fall of 1993 in Russia and
in most CIS states in 1994.  Most countries have had high positive real
interest rates since then.  The standing of the central banks has been
strengthened; some have obtained statutory independence, and all pur-
sue firmer monetary policies.  As a result of the abolition of subsidized
credits, exchange rates have stabilized.  The opportunities for rent-
seeking or easy money in banking have largely disappeared.
As a consequence of all of these measures, gross rents have fallen
sharply.  In Russia, gross rents probably dropped to about 10 percent of
GDP at the end of 1995 from over 75 percent of GDP in 1992.  In other
CIS countries, a similar development took place, although the peak
must have varied considerably.  The remaining rent-seeking came pri-
marily from other sources: state guarantees, budget subsidies, and
monopoly rents, while a small amount of export rent persisted.  In
other countries, such as Belarus and Ukraine, import rents have contin-
ued to be prominent.
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The larger and more interesting issue, however, is the political
economy of reducing rent-seeking.  How was it possible to cut this
misappropriation so swiftly?  The rent-seekers had acquired great eco-
nomic and political power.  In many countries, they ran the govern-
ment, while they held the government hostage in others.  How could
the behavior be changed so significantly in just a few years in most of
the countries concerned?  Fortunately, there have turned out to be many
ways, both political and economic, of eliminating rents.7
The best approach is undoubtedly a swift and comprehensive radi-
cal reform, as a broad economic literature has long argued (Lipton and
Sachs 1990).  The former Polish minister of finance made the point that
the government has a period of grace, a period of extraordinary poli-
tics, when out of idealism the population accepts a great deal of
change.  That is when as much economic reform as possible should be
implemented (Balcerowicz 1994).  This timing was achieved in
Poland, the Czech Republic, Estonia, and, to a reasonable extent, in
Latvia and Lithuania.
Even when initial overall reforms have failed, partial reforms have
still turned out to be surprisingly successful in the elements that were
introduced.  In general, few policy reversals have occurred.  For exam-
ple, there was no going back after Deputy Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar
succeeded in deregulating prices in Russia in January 1992.  After he
and Minister of Finance Boris Fedorov abolished subsidized credits in
September 1993, there were hardly any calls for new subsidized cred-
its.  Similarly, after Ukraine unified the exchange rate at the end of
1994, no opposition was heard.  The success of partial reforms is
somewhat surprising, considering that partial reforms usually failed
under communism (Kornai 1992).  Presumably, the conviction of the
inevitability of a market economy was strong enough to break some
resistance, and after one market economic norm had been adopted, that
approach started reinforcing itself.  In the public mind, the new norm
became the natural standard, and, as some economic interests started
benefiting from the policy, they defended it.
Over time, it becomes easier to attack rents simply because they
tend to decline.  There are many reasons for this.  The inflation tax
decreases, as people and enterprises realize that money is not a true
store of value during high inflation, and they keep increasingly less,
which in turn leads to a greater velocity of money.  Foreign trade rents
64 Åslund
shrink, as the initial, very low exchange rates appreciate in real terms,
and extreme price distortions are simply too expensive to maintain, so
that any government has to reduce them.  Eventually, no government
can finance a large budget deficit by any means after even the inflation
tax has been reduced, and, with other expenditure cuts, rents have to be
reduced.  The gradual decline in rents might be an important reason
why the resistance against radical economic change is so great at the
beginning of a reform effort.  The early opposition exists, not only
because people do not understand reforms and fear the unknown, but
also because the rent-seekers benefit the most then.  Later on, they may
let the rents go.  This timing of rents largely explains why the same
postcommunist regime in Moldova suddenly switched to a radical eco-
nomic reform policy in 1994, after having won an election campaign
by promising gradual reform.
Privatization has often been discussed as a form of rent-seeking but
should instead be seen as a primary means of its termination (Kauf-
mann and Siegelbaum 1996).  There are numerous reasons why this
should be the case.  First of all, privatization introduces real owners,
who tend to be concerned about their enterprises (Boycko, Shleifer, and
Vishny 1995).  Ludwig von Mises’ old dictum holds true: the very foun-
dation for profit-seeking is often considered to be private ownership.
Privatization implies depoliticization and individualization of enter-
prises.  Moreover, as state enterprises need massive restructuring, suffer
from underinvestment, and are usually badly managed, their assets
comprise a finite resource that is not likely to be more than one-tenth of
GDP in the early stages of the transition.  Thus, in hindsight, it is diffi-
cult to understand all of the concern about the privatization of large
enterprises, as so little value was actually involved.  Kazakhstan turned
to radical reform policies in late 1994 and stuck to them, partly because
of shrinking rents and partly because of swift insider privatization.
Ultimately, rent-seeking leads to steep falls in output and in the
standard of living.  Therefore, rent-seekers tend to be unable to cheat
the voters for long if democracy is being maintained.  Elections have
repeatedly ousted regimes of rent-seekers and engineered more radical
economic reforms, notably in Ukraine in July 1994, in Romania in
November 1996, and in Bulgaria in April 1997.  Alas, if there is no
democracy, this important method of correction is missing.  Telling
examples are Belarus, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan.
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Rent-seeking does not only reduce output but usually causes a
financial crisis, which means that tax revenues shrink, and the govern-
ment has to cut the budget.  This crisis is normally part of the reason
for sounder economic policies.  It illustrates how important it is that the
international community not be bankrolling countries that pursue bad
economic strategies.  A good current example is how Russia, or rather
Gazprom, has been allowing Belarus in particular to run up large
arrears.
When a financial crisis arises, most countries have nowhere to turn
but to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which ordains its stan-
dard economic policies: deregulation of prices and trade, which elimi-
nates price subsidies; a positive real interest rate and the abolition of all
interest subsidies; a unification of the exchange rate, which does away
with import subsidies; a limited budget deficit; and restrained mone-
tary expansion.  All of these measures serve to abolish rent-seeking,
and because the IMF provides substantial financing up front, it has
great clout.
Finally, people need a broad understanding of what a market econ-
omy is and what it is not, so that they realize what rent-seeking is and
how much it costs them.  In the end, sizable rent-seeking can only be
maintained with political repression, and even so it has to be relatively
limited, as the available sources of financing run dry.
THE END OF TRANSITION IS THE END 
OF RENT-SEEKING
In hindsight, it is evident that postcommunist transformation has
largely been a question of controlling rent-seeking.  The earlier that has
been done, the sooner a country has returned to economic growth.
Rent-seeking was enormous in the countries of the CIS but much less
in East-Central Europe.  There were many political and economic rea-
sons for the extraordinary rent-seeking in the post-Soviet countries, but
they essentially involved the lack of restrictions on a small elite left
behind by communism.  The damage caused by rent-seeking has been
huge, but it has, after all, diminished sharply within a few years.  A key
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issue is that large rents naturally become impossible to finance in the
long run; also they are not politically sustainable.  
Russia’s financial crisis, which culminated with both devaluation
of the ruble and default on government debt obligations in August
1998, can serve as an illustration.  In Russia, the rent-seekers thrived
on partial reforms in 1992 (Hellman 1998), but soon rents started
declining.  Russia had become highly pluralist and competitive.  There-
fore, the competition over rents intensified, which drove down rents
further (Shleifer and Vishny 1993).  The financial crisis reflected a des-
perate competition over declining rents, extreme short-sightedness of
the rent-seekers, and their total absence of social conscience.  The col-
lapse itself reduced the few remaining rents further and may very well
have laid a new base for more radical and thus more socially oriented
reforms in Russia, although the rents might still reappear in other
forms.
NOTES
1. I made a first attempt to sort out rent-seeking in Russia in Åslund (1996, pp. 12–
16).  This paper owes a great deal to my collaboration with Peter Boone and
Simon Johnson (Åslund, Boone, and Johnson 1996), to whom I express my grati-
tude.
2. In 1992, more than 70 percent of Russia’s exports were subject to export quotas
(Aven 1994, p. 84).  Total Russian exports outside of the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States (CIS) amounted to $42.4 billion that year (Goskomstat 1994, p. 3).
The average domestic price of these regulated exports was at most 10 percent of
the world market price, and export tariffs actually collected amounted to about
$2.4 billion.  GDP was only $80 billion at the market-determined exchange rate in
1992 (Åslund 1995, pp. 145–152, 197).  Hence, export rents were 70 percent of
$42.4 billion times 90 percent, minus $2.4 billion, which equals $24.3 billion.
Considering that GDP was $80 billion, export rents were almost exactly 30 per-
cent of GDP.  (Export rents were particularly high in 1992 because of the very low
exchange rate, which meant that exports appeared expensive in relation to the
GDP.)  Much of the capital flight arose from export rents.  For instance, an export
delivery was heavily underinvoiced, that is, officially sold below the market price,
but resold abroad at the market price, and the Russian exporters put the difference
in their bank accounts abroad.  The export statistics have been revised upwards to
compensate for such underinvoicing.
3. After the privileged exchange rates were gone, state guarantees effectively subsi-
dized gas importers, and when they were finally gone in 1996, gas importers sim-
ply benefited from monopoly rents.  In addition, these individuals refused to pay
others, while they insisted on being paid themselves.
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4. Granville (1995, p. 67).  This is not to say that all the rents were to the rich and
powerful.  Layard and Richter (1994, pp. 459–471) discuss the transfers between
different sectors of the economy (enterprises and households), but the benefits of
the rent-seekers cannot be identified with this approach.
5. Current information from Brunswick Brokerage, Moscow, early July 1997.  The
market capitalization of the 200 companies actively traded on the Moscow stock
market was assessed at $20.8 billion in April 1996 (Russian Economic Trends
1996, p. 32).
6. For a similar argument at a general level, see Maravall (1994, pp. 17–31) and
Geddes (1994, pp. 104–118).
7. An initial discussion of this is found in Åslund, Boone, and Johnson (1996, pp.
273–288).
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